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December 1988 Introduction 
The  12  Federal  Reserve  Banks  extend about  $1 15  bi  11  ion of credit within a 
few  hours  on  an  average  business  day,  only to  take it  back  again before  the 
close of  business.  Very  large commercial  banks  extend an  additional $45 
billion of credit to  other  domestic  and  foreign banks  each  day,  again,  only to 
take it  back  again before the close of  business. 
This huge  volume  of daylight credit takes  the form of temporary overdrafts 
of  deposit accounts at  Federal  Reserve  Banks  and  accumulated unsettled net 
payment  positions between  banks  who  participate in  Clearing House  Interbank 
Payment  System  (CHIPS).'  In  both cases,  telecommunication  of  payments  to 
other banks  produces  the  day1  ight credit.  Subsequent  telecommunication of 
payments  to  overdrawn banks  extinguishes  the  temporary  credit.  Daylight 
credit is  not a1 located by  any  market  process.  It is simply a  by-product of 
the order  in  which  a bank's  payments  and  receipts occur. 
Daylight credit created on  Fedwire and  CHIPS  is  free.  Banks  do pay  a 
small  fee  to send  telecommunicated  payment  messages,  on  both Fedwire and 
CHIPS,  but there is  no  explicit or,  as  far as  one  can  tell, implicit charge 
for  the amount  of  daylight credit extended on either network.  In  fact,  until 
regulatory limits were  imposed  in  1986,  daylight credit had  been  in  apparently 
unl  imi  ted supply  from Federal  Reserve  Banks,  a1 though  not necessari ly  between 
CHIPS  participants. 
Of  course,  a bank  would  have  to  pay  for overnight financing if that were 
needed  to cover  an  overdraft at the Fed  or a net debit position on  CHIPS  at 
close  of business.  Neither network  is  intended to  provide automatic  overnight 
financing.  It  is the nature of the American  banking  system  that overnight and longer-maturity credit is scarce  (with  the degree of  scarcity controlled in 
the aggregate by monetary pol  icy) and must be paid for, but dayl  ight credit is 
in  virtually unlimited supply and is free.' 
Using daylight credit is not a basic necessity for making payments.  A 
bank could avoid any need for dayl  i ght credi  t at a1  1 , if it  were wi  1 1 i ng to 
a1  locate a large enough portion of its assets to  reserve deposit balances.  Of 
course, that would be expensive,  because reserve deposits are non-interest- 
bearing assets.  A1  ternati  vely, modifying current transactions practices could 
reduce dependence on daylight credit.  Banks or  their customers could 
eliminate some payments  (for  example, by lengthening the maturity of 
1  iabi  1  i ties)  , or  adopt del  i berate payment sequencing programs, or borrow other 
banks'  idle balances for short periods during the day.  However, the incentive 
to  do  any of these things has been lacking because dayl  ight credit has been 
free. 
Daylight credit may be free, but it  is not without cost.  Growing 
recognition of its costs has prompted proposals that both Fedwire and CHIPS 
reduce dayl  ight credit by pricing.  Pricing dayl  ight credit would then 
induce banks to economize on it.  One proposal  would encourage this simply by 
imposing a slight per-dollar fee on daylight overdrafts.  Another would treat 
each daylight overdraft of a reserve account as an automatic overnight 
di  scount-window loan,  booked at a penalty rate.  A  third would require banks 
to  hold additional  balances at a Federal  Reserve Bank in proportion to  their 
dayl  i ght overdrafts. 
Evaluating these proposals requires an understanding of the costs of 
daylight credit, as well as of  policy objectives being sought.  An obvious 
cost of daylight credit is creditors' risk exposure, which is why this topic 
has become known as the payment system risk (PSR) problem.  Ri  sk-taking is a normal feature of financial markets.  To the extent that informed lenders 
assume risk in extending daylight credit, the cost of their exposure to 
daylight credit risk would not necessarily create a policy problem.  However, 
current institutional arrangements for making large-dollar-value payments in 
the U.S.  fully insure payor banks' access to daylight credit in making 
payments on the Federal Reserve el  ectroni  c network. 
Three problems are associated with daylight credit.  First, institutional 
insurance creates a moral hazard problem.  Second, extensions of dayl  ight 
credit on the private CHIPS network create a systemic risk problem, and third, 
the attempt of private networks to compete with Fedwire suggests a competitive 
inequality problem.  These three problems associated with dayl  ight credit, 
plus concern about the application of old law to new technology, create the 
PSR policy problem, which is examined in Part I.  Questions about possible 
policy objectives are raised in Part 11,  and Part I11 evaluates three recent 
reform proposal  s that would introduce pricing to resolve PSR problems.  The 
conclusion reached in Part IV is that none of these pricing proposals would, 
in itself, resolve the problems.  More basic decisions about technology and 
regulation must come first. 
I.  Daylight Credit and Payment System Risk 
In a monetary economy, a payee must be concerned with the validity of the 
device used by the payor to transfer value.  Finality characteristics of a 
payment specify circumstances under which the payee has irrevocable ownership 
of the amount transferred so that the payor's obligation is discharged. 
Settlement characteristics of  a payment determine the risk that irrevocable 
ownership is not accompanied by access to good funds. A.  Finality and  Risk.  Cash--legal  tender  fiat  money  in  the U.S.--i  s a 
riskless form of  payment  because  receipt of cash  gives  the payee  both 
ownership  and  funds.  For  checks,  on  the other hand,  the payee  has  only 
provisional ownership until the payment  is  settled.  The  check must  clear back 
to  the paying bank,  which  then has  an  opportunity to  reject it  for  reasons 
such as  insufficient funds or a stop payment  order.  Settlement occurs when 
the payor's  bank  fai  1s  to take  timely action to  return the check,  thereby 
accepting a debit to its  account  at the Federal  Reserve  or a correspondent 
bank.  Until this settlement has  been  accomplished,  however,  the payment  is 
not final.  The  payee's  bank  is extending credit to the payee if it  a1  lows 
proceeds  of  the check  to  be  used,  and  is  exposed  to  risk. 
Fedwire payments  provide receiver finality and  immediate  settlement,  as 
specified by Federal  Reserve  Regulation  3.  Receipt of the payment  message  is 
the signal  both that the payment  is final and  that good  funds  are available in 
the payee  bank's reserve deposit account.  This means  that the Federal  Reserve 
is extending credit to  any  payor  bank  having insufficient balances  to  cover 
its  Fedwi re payments.  Hence,  day1  ight overdrafts on  Fedwire expose  Federal 
Reserve  Banks  to credit risk. 
CHIPS  is  a different matter,  for which  there  is  no  "coherent  framework" of 
law or regulation for final  i  ty.  Payment  instructions are recorded among 
the  137  participating institutions during the day.  At  any  moment  during the 
day,  banks  that have  made  more  payments  than  they have  received are in  a net 
debit position,  representing credit granted by other participating banks. 
Positions are settled only at the close of the day  through a settlement 
account at the Federal  Reserve.  Banks  in  a net debit position pay  the net 
amounts  due  from them  into the settlement  account,  enabling payments  of  net 
amounts  due  to  banks  in  net credit positions.  Settlement  is  complete  only if each of  the net debit position banks  actually makes  the payment  required to 
repay the credit it  has  received.  CHIPS rules require that if a bank  cannot 
make  this settlement payment,  and  one  or more  lenders are unwilling to  fund 
the net debi t, then a1 1 of the day's  transactions  involving that bank  are to 
be  backed  out,  and  a new  set of  net debit and  credit positions calculated for 
the remaining participants.  As  currently constructed,  therefore,  payments 
made  on  CHIPS are based on  interbank extensions  of day1  ight credit.  Nhatever 
the  legal outcome  for finality,  a net debit position bank's  failure to  settle 
means  that other banks  are deprived of good  funds. 
With no  coherent  framework  for finality, it  is  not entirely clear who  is 
exposed  to  credit risk (payor,  payor  bank,  payee  bank,  payee)  in  the event of 
settlement  failures.  However,  aside from this uncertainty,  an  important 
policy concern  arises from the cost of settlement failure itself.  Although a 
single bank  may  have  extended credit directly to the bank  that fai  1  s  to  cover 
its  net debit at settlement,  all banks  are subject to  uncertainty about  the 
amount  of  good  funds  they  will receive or need  to  pay  at settlement as  long as 
any  bank  can  be  backed  out of the  settlement. 
A  presumption has  arisen that the federal  safety net removes  this 
uncertainty.  CHIPS handles  an  enormous  dai  ly  volume  of payments,  participants 
accumulate  substantial net debit positions relative to their capital during 
the day,  and  the CHIPS network plays an  integral role in  the global  money  and 
foreign-exchange  markets.  The  view  is  that,  were  a settlement failure to 
happen,  regulators would be  forced to  do whatever  was  necessary  to  a1  low 
settlement to  proceed by  arranging a quick rescue package  for the fai led 
institution,  or perhaps  by  providing financing to creditor banks  in  the amount 
of  their unsettled bilateral credit positions with respect  to  the failed 
institution.  The  federal  safety  net,  not CHIPS participants,  is  at risk. There  is  an  a1  ternative structure for private payment  networks,  which 
CHIPS  is soon  expected  to  adopt.  Settlement would be  guaranteed by  a 
risk-sharing agreement  among  participants,  providing for settlement finality. 
In  the event of a settlement  failure,  participants would provide funds  to 
cover  the credit represented by  the failed banks'  position,  in  accordance  with 
an  ex  ante  sharing agreement.  The  obvious  difference between  this and  Fedwire 
is the  creditworthiness of the entities underwriting payee  banks'  guarantee of 
good  funds  at settlement. 
Evaluating the significance of PSR  is  difficult.  Incidents of payor 
failures  during a business  day  have  been  almost unknown.  Bank  failures 
typically are arranged  to  take place overnight,  with the active involvement of 
regulatory authorities.  A  large constituency of foreign-based institutions in 
CHIPS may  make  unexpected  fai  lure during the day  more  1  ikely, if foreign 
regulators  were  to  act after the close of  business  in  their time zone,  but 
before  close of business  in  the U.S.  For  Fedwire,  a loss from the  intraday 
failure of  a bank  to  cover  its  daylight overdrafts would depend  on  terms 
worked  out in  a regulatory disposition of the failed bank. 
Actual  exposure  to loss--the enormous  amount  of daylight credit extended 
evaluated at an  historical  ly  minuscule probabi 1 i  ty of loss--seems  quite small 
relative to  Treasury receipts and  expenditures.  It is taxpayers  who  are at 
risk.  Any  charge  to  Federal  Reserve  income,  all else equal,  would result in 
an  equivalent decrease  in  Treasury revenue  and,  in  the short run,  an  increase 
in  Treasury debt  issued  to  the public.  In  addition,  of course,  this does 
represent a  roundabout open-market  operation  to  create the reserves  received 
by  payees  of  the fai  led bank.  However,  any  monetary  impact  could be  offset  by 
ordi  nary System  open-market  securi  ty sales  . 8.  Payment  System Risk and  Cost.  The  PSR  problem  in  large-dollar payment 
networks  is  not so much  the potential dollar loss to taxpayers  or even  to 
private network participants,  but three derivative problems:  moral  hazard, 
systemic  risk,  and  competitive  inequality.  In  addition,  there is  some  concern 
about  how  uncollateralized daylight credit resulting from modern 
telecommunication  of  payments  fits  into the 75-year  old framework of  the 
Federal  Reserve  Act. 
1.  Moral  Hazard.  The  Federal  Reserve  creates moral  hazard by  insuring access 
s 
to daylight credit for payor banks.  Payee  banks  have  no  incentive  to  concern 
themselves  with the creditworthiness of  banks  from whom  they receive Fedwire 
messages,  if that is the only relationship between  them.  Nor  do  payor  banks 
have  any  incentive to concern  themselves  with market perceptions of their own 
creditworthiness as  a means  of assuring the  willingness of  other banks  to 
accept  payments  from them.  Uninsured creditors,  as  well as  supervisors and 
regulators,  of course,  are concerned with the credit quality of banks,  but, 
unti  1 the preparation and  introduction of the Board's  P'sR  pol  icy in  1986, 
little  or no attention was  given to  PSR--at  least in  part because  there had 
been  no way  to  document  the extent to  which daylight overdrafts existed. 
Just as  100-percent  automobile  liability insurance may  deter  accident 
prevention,  so  too,  100-percent payment  ri  sk i  nsurance  surely has  deterred 
payment  risk prevention.  Manifestations of moral  hazard  in  the payments  case 
may  seem more  obscure  than nonchalance  at the  wheel  in  the automobile  case. 
Nonetheless,  they exist,  and  regulation has  only recently begun  to  focus  on 
them. 
Identifying manifestations of moral  hazard may  be  easier if the benefits 
of 100-percent payment  risk insurance are clearly in  view.  The  overriding 
benefit to  consumers  and  businesses  in  the U.S.  is that there  is  no real impediment  to  receiving or making  large (or  small)  value  same-day  payments 
through any  pair of the thousands  of banks  with access  to  Fedwire.  Those 
impediments  otherwi  se  would  be  the cost or unavai  labi  1  i  ty  of immediate, 
re1  iable information  about  the solvency  and  liquidity of any  bank  in  the 
nation from which  chance  might bring a payment.  Fedwire,  by  design of  the 
Federal  Reserve  System  early in  this century,  has  provided a mechani sm  for 
encouraging a truly national payment  system out of  a fractionated private 
banking  system. 
The  obverse of this original benefit in the modern  world of 
telecommunications  can  be  seen  in  the reliance of  many  banks  on  overnight 
borrowing for  a significant portion of their financing,  with attendent 
possibilities of rapid run-off of that financing.  Lenders  can  decide anew 
each  day  whether  to  risk another  overnight loan.  The  overnight borrower  bank 
can  return funds  each morning and  tailor borrowing to the needs  of the new 
day,  with the interval spent  in  daylight debt  to  the central bank.  Similarly, 
a plethora of  new  markets  in  sophisticated financial  instruments  has  grown  up 
on  a foundation  of riskless private payments  in  which  the quality of the 
payor's bank  is largely irrelevant to  trading decisions. 
The  moral  hazard  is to the pub1  ic that provides  the  insurance.  Any 
unexpected question about  the credit quality of a bank  can  create an  immediate 
1  iquidity crisis that necessarily must  have  an  immediate  resolution.  That 
resolution will be  to  roll over  the bank's  daylight overdraft into either an 
overnight overdraft at the central  bank  or a discount-window  loan from the 
central bank.  As an  operational  matter,  an  overnight overdraft is  automatic 
if  a bank  does  not come  to  the discount  window  to  borrow.  Only a small  subset 
of  banks,  including those under  close  supervisory watch,  have  a1 1 their 
Fedwire payments  monitored in  real time against  agreed minimum  balances  during the day.  In the more normal cases, the central bank is not in a position to 
refuse overnight overdrafts because account balances are only monitored ex 
post.  In effect,  the insurer knows about reckless driving only after the 
accident. 
2.  Systemic Risk.  Absence of payment insurance on a private payments network 
like CHIPS avoids the moral hazgrd problem of  Fedwire.  Payee banks themselves 
must recognize the possibi  1  ity that a payor bank might fail to  cover its 
daylight debt on the network.  Evaluating the probability of  loss, controlling 
dayl  ight exposure with respect to  each payor bank, and maintaining a capital 
cushion appropriate to these exposures would be the expected behavior of payee 
banks in the face of such direct dayl  ight credit risk.  However, systemic risk 
would remain for the most part unmanzged  because it is not readily evaluated 
and is probably underestimated by network participants. 
The concept of systemic risk reflects the interdependence of a payments 
network and the consequent potential for chain reactions of settlement 
failures.  The triggering event would be failure of a network participant to 
repay net daylight credit extended by other network participants.  Under the 
current CHIPS rule, backing out a1  1 of that day's payments from and to  the 
failed  bank wi  11 create new and unexpected net credit and debit positions for 
remaining banks.  It is at this point that the systemic risk phenomenon might 
begin.  If  one or more banks were unable to  fund their new and unexpected net 
debit positions, then their day's  transactions would have to be backed out and 
yet another new settlement calculated.  The chain reaction might continue  if 
additional banks were unable to  fund these newer and unexpected positions, and 
so forth.' 
Granted that such a chain reaction might occur, it need not be of any 
unique concern to policymakers if  network participants were able to evaluate and  manage  their systemic risk exposure.  But,  as  currently constituted, 
payment  system arrangements  probably prevent  that,  because  systemic  risk is 
likely to  be  underweighted  in  bank  decisions to  extend  daylight credit.  This 
reflects  two  informational  deficiencies. 
The  first  is a lack of information that would  allow banks  to  evaluate 
conditional  probabilities of settlement failure.  While  a bank  may  evaluate 
the probabi 1  i  ty  of  failure by  each  participant from which it  directly accepts 
payments,  it  currently seems  doubtful  that there is a firm  basis for judging 
the probabi 1  i  ty  of a second-round  fai  1  ure of each  parti  ci  pant,  condi  tioned on 
prior failure of  another,  and  further conditioned on  failures at succeeding 
stages  of the chain.  Aside from computational  complexity,  these probabi  1  i  ties 
would depend  on  the bilateral credit- position of each  bank  with respect  to 
each  of  the others,  and  the mu1 ti  lateral net posl  tion of each.  Each  of  these 
positions may  show  regularities,  but they are unknown  to  all but the directly 
concerned  participants. 
Another  aspect  of this problem involves a negative externality.  Extension 
of  daylight credit by  any  participant affects other participants because  each 
extra dollar of credit extended  increases  the riskiness of each  prior 
creditor's exposure.  Social  cost  (in terms  of risk) of extra daylight credit 
may  be  larger than  the perceived private cost,  leading to  overlending. 
The  second  informational deficiency  is  simply a general  lack of knowledge 
of  how  the chain reaction of systemic  failures would play itself out.  The 
process  is not a known  quantity because it  has  not happened,  or has  not been 
a1  lowed  to  happen.  Three  uncertainties i  1  lustrate this,  involving the 
likelihood of private interbank  lending,  supervisory  treatment of liquidity 
insolvencies,  and  the role of the lender of last resort. 
A  chain reaction would  continue only if  potential end-of-day  lenders of overnight funds  (including  the network  participants with new  and  unexpected 
net credit positions)  were  unwilling to lend the funds required for settlement 
by  those  in  new  and  unexpected  net debit positions.  After a1 1, if  the only 
unsound  institution were  the bank  that triggered the potential chain reaction, 
why  wouldn't  potential private lenders  recognize that next-round banks  were 
merely i  11  iquid,  not insolvent?  Even if the next-round banks  had  substantial 
loans outstanding to the triggering insolvent bank,  the chances  of those  loans 
being a total loss in  eventual  1  iquidation,  and of depleting the capital of 
the next-round banks,  would  seem  remote. 
Nonetheless,  unwillingness of  private institutions to  lend does  seem 
rational,  and  therefore plausible,  under  the combination of two quite  1 ikely 
conditions.  One  is  that new  and  unexpected  net debit positions of  some  banks 
can  be  quite large relative to  their capital.  Interbank overnight  lending is 
unsecured,  so  that a borrower's  capital cushion relative to  the size of  the 
needed  credit is  a significant indicator of the lender's risk,  whether  that 
lender  acts alone or in some  hastily arranged  consortium of  lenders. 
The  other condition is  the haste with which  such  lending must  be 
arranged.  A  settlement failure would  become  known,  and  unexpected net debit 
and  credit positions calculated,  only at,  or close to,  the end  of  a day's 
normal  market  activity.  Lending  would  have  to  be  completed  before the opening 
of  the next business  day if  market  disruption were  to  be  avoided.  Within this 
short time frame,  reliable information upon  which  to  base  credit decisions 
would be  scarce,  requiring hasty judgments  about  institutions and  their assets 
and  liabilities in  an  interdependent network of  banks. 
A  second  uncertainty concerns  the reaction of supervisory authorities if 
second,  third,  and  further-round banks  were  unable  to  finance new  and 
unexpected  net debit positions as  the chain reaction proceeded.  These  banks would show a net debit in the amount that forced them out of the settlement 
process, but with an offsetting net credit position with respect to  one or 
more banks that already had been backed out of that, and previous, rounds of 
the settlement process.  Except for the trigger bank, each bank in backed-out 
status might be solvent in the usual sense, but insolvent in the sense that it 
was unable to honor requests for payment--a liquidity insolvency. 
Would supervi  sory authori  ties declare such banks insolvent and force them 
to  close, or would they allow them to continue operating?  Given time to sort 
out obligations free of a threat of  imminent failure, such banks might resume 
normal operations once they had demonstrated their sound credit condition to 
lenders under more lei  surely conditions and with full  informztion disclosure. 
But such a reaction by supervisory authorities to permit this resolution of a 
chain reaction is uncertain. 
Third, the reaction of  the lender of last resort is uncertain, hinging in 
part on the outcome of the solvency issue.  Discount-window loans may not be 
made to  insolvent institutions,  Loans to solvent institutions at  any round of 
the chain reaction would bring an immediate end to  the reaction by providing 
the funds needed to  achieve a successful  settlement.  Acceptable col  lateral 
might be difficult to  assemble, but the presence of a willing last-resort 
lender to  banks other than the trigger bank would eliminate systemic risk to 
network participants. 
Systemic risk may exist, but network participants are not in a position to 
evaluate the risk fully in making daylight credit judgments.  This risk is 
probably underestimated  by  banks, because private risk costs understate social 
cost in extensions of private daylight credit, and because it seems reasonable 
to  expect supervisory and lender-of-last-resort actions to  prevent the chain 
reaction of settlement failure.  For these reasons, control  1  ing systemic risk might  involve active pol  icy oversight of private network  arrangements. 
3.  Competitive Inequality.  Free daylight credit insurance gives  Fedwire a 
competi ti  ve  advantage.  Fedwi re i  s a money  transfer system,  wi  th settlement on 
the books  of the Federal  Reserve.  Other  domestic  money  transfer systems  have 
attempted  to  compete  with Fedwire (Cashwire  and  CHESS),  but competition was 
difficult  before the Monetary  Control  Act  (MCA)  required Fedwire  to  price 
transfers  explicitly,  rather than  implicitly as  part of the cost of  membership 
in  the Federal  Reserve  System.  Since  the MCA,  price and  service qua1 i  ty 
features  of  making payments  have  provided a basis for competition,  but 
settlement has  been  a problem. 
The  Federal  Reserve  provides a settlement facility for private networks," 
illustrated by  the CHIPS  settlement process  described above,  but this is  a net 
settlement,  meaning  that settlement risk exists throughout  the day,  unti  1 the 
net  settlement process i  s successful ly  completed.  Current PSR  pol  icy requi  res 
that each participant in  a private network  set a limit on  the amount  of  credit 
it  wi  11 extend to  each  other participant,  and  that the network  impose  a  1  imi  t 
on  the credit a single participant may  obtain from all other participants 
combined,  and  that the total credit drawn  by  a single bank  on  private systems 
plus  its  daylight overdraft at the  Federal  Reserve  not exceed  a preset maximum 
at any  time during a day.  Private  system  credit risk still  exists,  although 
subject to these  limits,  such  that each  participant has  some  incentive to 
concern  itself with the credit quality of each  other network participant. 
The  upshot of these  institutional arrangements  is  simply this:  Fedwire 
provides receiver  finality because  the Federal  Reserve  extends  daylight credit 
to payors,  and  at no charge.  Net  settlement  systems  offer settlement 
finality.  Without binding assurance  that the lender of last resort wi  11 underwrite settlement,  participants are exposed  to  direct and  (probably 
underestimated)  systemic  risk,  as  on CHIPS,  or at least to  indirect risk as  a 
result of  some  ex  ante risk-sharing agreement  among  network participants. 
Managing  risk imposes  costs on  participants in  the form of  monitoring the 
creditworthiness of  other participants,  managing  bilateral credit limits, and 
maintaining a capital cushion against potential losses.  On  Fedwire,  these 
costs  are absent. 
That  CHIPS  flourishes despite the competitive inequality of a pub1  ic 
subsidy  to  Fedwire  is usually attributed to its  market niche in  serving 
foreign  participants,  which  Fedwire has  not entered.  But  competition of other 
networks  with Fedwire for domestic  funds  transfer traffic under  current 
institutional arrangements  would  seem  feasible only if  private competitors 
were  so much  more  efficient in  processing payment  messages  that this cost 
advantage  would offset their risk disadvantage.  It  may  be  that this 
competitive disadvantage  was  a factor in  the demise  of CashWire  and  CHESS,  two 
networks  that once  competed  for domesti  c payments  business.  Thi s suggests 
that there is  no basis for a market  test of the willingness of private agents 
to  accept risk in  making  domestic  payments,  nor of the operating efficiency of 
Fedwi  re. 
4.  Law  and  Technology.  Arguments  that daylight overdrafts should be 
prohibited can  take another  form.  The  Federal  Reserve,  as  the nation's 
central bank,  is  a unique  governmental  institution.  Since  the demise of  the 
gold exchange  standard,  the System has  had  unlimited abi  1  ity  to  create credit 
by issuing high-powered money  in  the form of currency and  bank  reserve 
deposits.  The  Federal  Open  Market Committee  is charged  with making  the 
decisions that determine  the aggregate amount  of this fiat  money  in existence.  The Federal Reserve Act constrains System credit creation to two 
riskless activities.  One is the purchase of U.S.  government securities in the 
open market  (not  directly from the Treasury).  The other is direct 
discount-window loans to eligible institutions at the prevailing discount 
rate,  fully secured by eligible collateral. 
Daylight overdrafts of reserve deposit accounts can be viewed as a third 
means of extending central bank credit, which was not contemplated in an Act 
drafted  before the development of sophi  sti  cated telecommunication networks. 
Daylight overdrafts not only are free, but also are uncollateralized.  That 
this third means of extending credit is not mentioned specificaliy as 
requiring collateral in the Federal Reserve Act probably reflects an 
historical understanding that such overdrafts would not take place.  For 
example, the first operating letter of the Federal Reserve Bank of  Cleveland 
governing transfers of funds, when adopted in 1939, said, "Collected funds on 
deposit -- are available for telegraphic or mail transfer ...";  "Telegraphic 
transfers ... of bank balances ..."  would be  processed, where "The term 'bank 
balances' shall  be construed to mean an accumulation of funds comprising an 
establ  i  shed account maintained by a member bank .  . .  " (emphasis  added). ' 
When Subpart B of Regulation J  was first adopted, August 1, 1977, however, 
the fact of  daylight overdrafts was clearly recognized by providing that, if  a 
bank did not have a sufficient ".  .  .balance of actually and finally collected 
funds" to cover transfers during a day, the Reserve Bank claimed a security 
interest in any or all of the bank's assets in the possession of,  or held for 
the account of, the Reserve Bank.  Notwithstanding that claim, the Reserve 
Bank also could refuse to act on a transfer request "...at  any time when such 
Federal Reserve Bank has reason to believe that the balance maintained or used 
by  such transfer is not sufficient to cover such item."  Purists may be forgiven for questioning whether the treatment of daylight overdrafts, even as 
protected by these regulatory provisions, is fully consonant with provisions 
of the Federal Reserve Act. 
11.  Objectives Underlying Payment System Risk Policy 
Entering into PSR policy debate requires a clear notion of policy 
objectives.  To  date, Federal Reserve PSR policy has been fashioned with the 
explicit objective of  reducing PSR, quantified as daylight overdraft exposure 
plus net daylight credit drawn on CHIPS. 
Historical background suggests that existing PSR policy was a reaction to 
mushrooming PSR exposure associated with the telecommunications rev01 ution in 
the payment mechanism  (see  appendix).  For example, in 1947,  reserve deposit 
balances represented 700 percent of  (seven  times) the value of daily debits 
(Fedwire,  checks, etc.)  to member bank reserve accounts; by 1983, balances 
were a minuscule 4  percent of daily debits.'  That is, in 1947, the average 
bank could make all  necessary payments for seven successive business days 
without ever receiving a single offsetting payment before exhausting its 
initial reserve deposit balance.  By 1983, the average bank could meet demands 
for  payment for only 20 minutes of a single eight-hour business day before it 
would have had to  receive some offsetting payments, or go into overdraft. 
Over the course of 35 years, the Federal  Reserve apparently moved from a 
cash-in-advance system, in which Fedwire payments involved no  risk, to  a 
largely automatic daylight credit system, in which the Federal Reserve is 
exposed to  upwards of $50 billion of daily credit risk on Fedwire alone, plus 
another $60 bi 11  ion on the book-entry system, whi  1  e CHIPS participants extend 
about $45 billion. 
It is understandable that policy discussion has emphasized daylight credit reduction:  having seen  a horse  escape  from the corral into the fields,  the 
first reaction is  to  close any  holes  in the fence around  the fields so  the 
horse can't  go  any  further,  and  then begin the process of moving  the horse 
back  toward  the corral.  Without  pushing  this analogy  too far,  much  of  current 
PSR  debate  is about  which  combination of sugar  cubes  and  whips  should be  used 
to  get the dayl  ight overdraft "horse" back  closer  to the old low-ri  sk 
"corral,"  on  the assumption  that moving  the horse  in  that direct  ion--reduci ng 
Federal  Reserve  dayl  ight overdrafts--i s the appropriate objective. 
Before  investigating various pol  icy proposal s to  reduce ri  sk,  it  seems 
only prudent  to  recognize  that reducing dayl  ight overdrafts might not be  the 
only,  or best,  objective for public policy today.  Some  other choices  include 
doing nothing,  achieving competitive equality,  or restructuring institutional 
arrangements  to  a1  low  private agents more  choice between  risky and  safe 
payment  devices. 
Doing nothing,  in the  sense  of delaying further pol  icy action, may  seem 
counterproductive even  as  a short-run pol  icy objective.  However,  current 
pol  icy has  placed some  limits around  substantial  further increases  in  PSR 
exposure.  Delay might yield better decisions  with a broader  consensus  for 
more  effective future policy actions.  Current PSR  exposure  appears  to  be  an 
accident of  history in the  sense  that it  grew  to substantial proportions 
before  gaining widespread recognition.  PSR  reflects,  in  part,  the 
revolutionary impact of technological  change  on  payment  practices.  Perhaps 
the  new  technology  is  most  useful  when  abetted by a substantial  volume  of 
daylight credit that is somehow  worth the moral  hazard and  systemic  risk 
cost.  Reducing  exposure may  seem  an  agreeable objective,  but how  far  should 
it  be  reduced?  How  can  we  determine  whether  the optimal  quantity of dayl  ight 
credi t  i s substantial  ly  lower  than current  1  eve1  s? Competitive equality might be  a more  basic  issue than risk.  Deposit 
insurance  and  the lender of  last resort may  be  capable  of  dealing with the 
costs of  daylight credit risk exposure.  The  basic issue may  be  how  to 
structure increasingly unnecessary  public provision of  payment  service in  such 
a way  that private services are not precluded from  operating in the same 
market.  Modern  telecommunication capabi 1  i  ties and  nationwide banking may  make 
obsolete the original basic rationale for government provision of 
service--assuring uniform  nationwide access  to  the payment  system.  The  MCA 
requires that Federal  Reserve  services pass  a market  test,  but,  so far,  MCA 
implementation has  not encompassed  the possible inequity of tying Federal 
Reserve  services to  free central-bank risk underwriting. 
Why  not a1  low private agents  to  choose  the risk exposure  they want?  The 
federal  government  has  defined ri  skl  ess  cash-payment  devices  since 1792,  but 
private agents  have  chosen  to  accept  risk in  making  some  payments,  first  by 
using private bank  notes,  and  then checks,  both with risky finality  and 
settlement features.  Electronic payments  are now  in the ascendency,  due  in 
part,  no doubt,  to  free Federal  Reserve  settlement insurance.  Perhaps  the 
objective of  PSR  policy should be  the creation of  an  institutional environment 
in  which agents  face a fair choice not only among  risk-free, but also between 
risk-free and risky,  electronic payments. 
An  obvious objection to this perspective  is  that,  by allowing risky 
electronic payments,  more  risk  may  fall into the federal  safety net.  Other 
objections to  this, or to  delay,  or to  seeking competitive  equity as  policy 
objectives,  are surely relevant.  The  point is, however,  that evaluating 
proposals  to  reduce PSR  should not obscure  the view  that risk reduction within 
the existing institutional environment  may  not be  the best objective. 111.  Three  Pol  icy Proposal  s 
Recently,  three different proposal s for reformi  ng  PSR  pol  icy have  drawn 
attention.  A1 1 three aim at reducing Federal  Reserve  PSR  exposure by making 
dayl  ight credit costly,  but they  involve seemingly  quite different 
institutional features.  A brief sketch of each  will set the  stage for  an 
evaluation of their differences,  and  of their potential impacts. 
As  an  operational matter,  the  three proposals are a1  ike in  presuming no 
change  in  the regulatory and  operational  framework  within which  Fedwire 
operates.  Banks  would  be  able to control  their dayl  ight overdrafts  by 
real-time monitoring of their account balances  at the Fed.  The  Reserve Banks, 
however,  would  not incorporate the real  -time monitor into Fedwi re.  Relying on 
the existing ex-post dayl  ight overdraft monitoring system means  that the 
Reserve  Banks  would not be  in  a position to  delay or reject payment  requests 
that would  cause  an  overdraft,  for example,  by  routing them  instead to  the 
discount  window,  or to  a supplemental  balance  department,  or to  a 
1  imi  t-enforci  ng  department  under  the respective proposals,  before deciding 
whether  to let  a  Fedwire payment  proceed.  Of  course,  Reserve  Banks  would 
police the balances of  problem banks  and  certain special  Fedwire users  in  real 
time  against predetermined overdraft limits,  just as  they do  now. 
At the  individual  bank  level,  daylight overdrafts  (DOD)  arise when 
accumulated debits  (Db)  to the bank's  reserve balance  at some  point during the 
day  exceed  the sum  of its  opening  balance  of  required  (RR)  and  excess  (XR) 
reserves held overnight,  plus accumulated  credits (Cr)  to  the account: 
DOD  =  (Db - RR - XR - Cr)  >  0. 
The  nature of the daylight credit financing problem  is  that a bank 
requires funding only for a portion of a day--whether  a few moments  or a few 
hours--before  incoming credits to  its  account  offset the need.  A full day of  24 hours might  include an  8-hour  "daylight" period (10:OO  a.m.  to  6:00 
p.m.)  and  a 16-hour  "overnight" period  (6:00  p.m.  to 10:OO  a.m.  the next 
day).  Daylight overdrafts and  reserve balances  borrowed  in  a dayl  ight funds 
market,  if  one  were  to  develop,  would  be  drawn  down  and  then repaid during one 
daylight period,  without any  need  for overnight financing.  A  full 24-hour  day 
loan of reserve balances  would be  drawn  down  at the beginning of  one  dayl  ight 
period and  repaid at the beginning of the next daylight period.  Overnight 
loans of  reserve balances  would be  drawn  down  at the end  of  one  dayl  ight 
period and  repaid at the beginning of the next. 
The  penalty rate proposal,  offered in  several  variants by Wayne  Angel 1, 
member  of the Board of  Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  System,  would 
eliminate current quantitative restrictions on  each bank's  use  of  dayl  ight 
credit.  Instead,  a bank  would borrow  the amount  of  any  dayl  ight overdraft  as 
a collateralized loan from its  Federal  Reserve  Bank  discount window,  ex  post, 
at an  above-market  penalty rate.  The  Federal  Reserve  Banks  would  pay  a (below 
market)  rate of return on  excess  reserves,  providing an  offset  to  the costs of 
any  extra reserve-account  balances  that banks  might hold to  avoid the penalty 
rate on  overdraft loans.  Thus,  under  normal  circumstances,  no  bank  would run 
a daylight overdraft and  pay  the penalty rate intentionally because  the 
maximum  cost to a bank  of  avoiding a dayl  ight overdraft would  be  only the 
interest rate spread  between  its cost of financing extra excess  reserves  and 
the rate earned on  those  holding^.^  In  the aggregate,  this extra demand  for 
reserve balances  would  be  matched  by extra supply  produced by  open market 
purchases  of Treasury  securities for the System Open  Market  Account. 
The  supplemental  balance  proposal,  described by  staff of the Federal 
Reserve  Bank  of New  York,  also could eliminate current  quantitative 1  imi  ts on 
each bank's  use  of dayl  ight credit.  Instead,  a bank  would  be  required to maintain extra below-market , i  nterest-beari  ng  reserve deposi  ts  in  a current 
period (the  supplemental  balance)  equal  to some  fraction,  r  <  1,  of  daylight 
overdrafts of its  regular reserve-deposit  balance  in  a prior period.  The 
maximum  cost to  a bank  of  a  do1 lar's dayl  ight overdraft today would  be  the 
fraction,  r, of the expected next-period spread between  the cost of  financing 
a do1  lar'  s supplemental  balance  and  the rate earned on  the supplemental 
balance.  The  proposal  envisions  fixing both the fraction, r,  and  the  spread; 
assuming  that the  spread  is  measured  from a market rate reasonably close to 
the bank's  cost of financing,  the maximum  cost of  a daylight overdraft  would 
be  a constant,  a  = r  (spread).  Again,  in the aggregate,  the extra 
supplemental  balance demand  for reserve balances  would  be  matched  by  extra 
supply produced  by  the System Open  Market  Account. 
The  pricing proposal,  suggested  by  the System's  Large-Dollar Payments 
System  Advisory Group,  would retain (or perhaps  reduce)  current quantitative 
1  imi  ts on  each  bank's  use  of dayl  ight credit,  but,  within that 1  imi  t, have  the 
Federal  Reserve  charge  a price for any  bank's  Fedwire overdrafts in  excess  of 
a base  amount.  The  maximum  cost to  a bank  of a dollar's daylight overdraft, 
within the two  limits,  would be  the administered price,  a. 
A.  Dayliqht Overdraft Reducing Mechanisms 
In  each  proposal,  a bank  would pay  a positive explicit or implicit price 
to prevent or cover  a net debit in  its  reserve  account.  Federal  Reserve 
dayl  ight overdrafts would be  expected to  decline because  this price would  be 
higher  than  the current price of a dayl  ight overdraft,  which  is zero.  Banking 
operations would  be  expected  to  respond  to the increased price through  some 
combination of three adjustment mechanisms:  increased holdings of  excess 
reserve balances,  redistribution of reserve balances  through a dayl  ight funds market,  and modified payment  practices. 
Extra overnight holdings of  excess  reserves  would  increase the initial 
balance  from which debits could be  absorbed.  A  private daylight credit market 
could redistribute existing reserve balances  from banks  having them  and  not 
needing  them  during the day,  but only overnight,  to  banks  not having them  and 
needing  them only during the day,  but not overnight. '  The  Federal  Reserve 
preempts  such  a market now  by  providing free daylight overdrafts,  but if 
overdrafts  were  costly,  and  timely del  ivery of funds  were  re1  iable,  borrowing 
in  an  interbank daylight funds market  might be  an  inexpensive means  of 
preventing net debits to  a reserve account during a day. 
Final  ly,  modifying payment  practices could change  the relative amounts  of 
debits and  credits,  or their sequence  during the day.  A  bank  might do  this by 
lengthening the maturity of its 1 iabi  1  i  ties or adopting a  continuing contract 
for  federal  funds borrowing,  with daily renegotiation of the rate but no  daily 
repayment  and  re-receipt of  funds.  Or,  a  bank  might  induce pairs of 
institutional customers operating in securities markets  to  net their 
transactions obl i  gat  ions during a day,  producing a si  ngle small  obl  igation for 
daily payment,  again reducing debits that might now  precede  credits.  Or, 
groups  of banks  might  join private payment  networks,  with only net settlement 
at the Federal  Reserve. 
Each  of the three proposals might induce these adjustment mechanisms. 
Each  has  the common  characteristic of increasing the cost  to  a bank  of 
financing  payments  during a day,  here  cal  led the marginal  cost of  preventing a 
net debit to  its  reserve account,  MCDb. 
A  cost-minimizing bank  seeking to  avoid a daylight overdraft might 
consider  the adjustment mechanism of  acquiring excess  reserves  in the federal 
funds  market  at a cost RF.  After meeting its temporary  daylight need  to cover payments, the bank would then have these extra funds avai  lable to hold, 
or to loan out overnight, at a rate of return RON, if there were a private 
overnight market.  The marginal cost of  preventing a net debit in its reserve 
account would be the difference between the two rates: MCgE =  (RF - 
RON).  A1  ternatively, the bank might turn to a daylight credit market, 
borrowing the funds and repaying before the close of business, at the rate 
Roc.  This rate would represent the marginal cost of preventing a net debit 
in its reserve account: MCE; =  Roc. 
As  a third alternative  (and  presumably adopted as a relatively permanent 
change by many banks and their customers over a longer period than a single 
day),  it might modify some payment practices.  This, too, would involve some 
cost, such as paying higher rates on longer-term liabilities or receiving 
lower prices or revenues for payments services when institutional customers 
engage in netting obl  igations, or by sharing the cost of a private payment 
network." Assuming banks adopt the cheapest payment modifications first 
and then contemplate more expensive changes, the marginal cost of  preventing 
successively larger net debits in reserve accounts by modifying payments 
practices, MC:LP,  would increase, suggesting a rising marginal cost 
relationship with the volume of net debit avoided by this means. 
In equilibrium, cost-minimizing banks would adopt the unique combination 
of adjustment mechanisms with marginal costs equal to  or less than the 
marginal cost of a daylight overdraft, MCEz =  MCEE =  MC:EP~  MCDoD. 
Banks would avoid one of these three mechanisms only if  its marginal costs 
were fixed  permanently above the others.  It is within this cost-minimizing 
context that the effects of the three proposals on daylight overdrafts can be 
compared. B.  Effects  on Daylight Overdrafts 
The  penalty rate proposal  would  set the marginal  cost of a daylight 
overdraft at the above-market rate,  Rp.  NO  bank  would  choose  to  pay  this 
price as  long as  a cheaper  a1  ternative were  available.  Except  in  the  waning 
moments  of the business day,  when  markets  in  reserve balances  were  closing or 
closed,  banks  would have  cheaper  alternatives because  of the rate structure 
envisioned  in  the proposal .  With  RF  <  Rp,  and  with RON  >  0,  a bank 
could hold excess  reserves  and  avoid a net debit during the daylight period at 
a cost  (RF -  RON).  Market arbitrage would  be  expected  to result,  in 
equilibrium,  in  RDc =  (RF  -  RON),  SO  the alternative of  borrowing  in  the 
daylight funds market  would be  just as  attractive.''  And,  with positive 
marginal  costs for these  reserve and  funds market  adjustments,  banks  would be 
expected  to  adopt modified payment  practices  with marginal  costs  less than or 
equal  to (RF -  RON). 
The  supplemental  balance proposal  would  create a marginal  cost of  day1  ight 
overdrafts  of rEt(RF -  Rse),+,.  A  dollar of daylight overdraft today 
would  incur a cost equal  to the fraction, r, of the expected net cost of 
financing  the holding of  a dollar supplemental  balance  in  a future period.  By 
design,  this cost would be  a constant  amount,  o.  Again,  a daylight credit 
market might develop,  but with an  upper  price limit  of  o.  The  same  upper 
1  imi  t would  apply to the marginal  cost of  modifying payment  practices.  Note 
that excess  reserves over  and  above  any  supplemental  balances  would not earn 
interest.  This means  that "plain vanilla" extra excess  reserves  would not be 
a cost-effective means  of avoiding daylight overdrafts because  the cost of 
financing  them normally would  be  greater  than o, the cost of a daylight 
overdraft.  This also means  that the  source of  funds  for a daylight credit 
market  would  be  restricted to  the required reserves  of banks  whose  payments needs for daylight balances were less than their need for required reserves. 
The pricing proposal sets the marginal cost of a dayl  ight overdraft at the 
administered price, w.  Excess reserves would not be a cost-effective means 
of avoiding daylight overdrafts in this proposal, either.  The cost of 
financing excess reserves normally would be higher than n.  A  1 imi  ted 
dayl  ight credit market could develop, redi  stri  buti  ng the required reserves of 
those banks whose needs for daylight balances were less than their need for 
required reserve balances.  Modifications in payment practices with marginal 
cost no greater than s  would be the only other cost-effective means of 
avoiding daylight overdrafts in this proposal. 
The three proposals, equivalently priced, would not necessari  ly produce 
equivalent reductions in Federal Reserve daylight overdraft risk exposure. 
This can be seen by standardizing the marginal cost of  preventing a net debit 
at a common rate (CR):  CR =  (RF - RON) =  u  =  n. 
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rate, a1  1  three proposals would yield identical  modifications in payment 
practi  ces--namely, a1  1  those dayl  i ght-credi  t economizing modifications that 
produce a marginal cost of preventing a net debit less than or equal to  CR. 
In addition, they should produce equivalent redistribution of  required reserve 
balances through a private dayl  ight credit market.  Only if  those two effects 
were sufficient  to prevent a1  1  net debits would the three proposals have the 
same impact on Federal  Reserve daylight overdrafts--by complete elimination. 
Otherwise, the remaining need to  avoid or cover net debits would differ  among 
the proposals. 
In the penalty rate proposal, the remaining need would be met by excess 
reserves, supplied by the System Open Market Account as it sought to maintain 
a pol  icy-desired  (or  determined)  RF.  These extra reserve balances might be 
redistributed through the private daylight funds market to maintain Roc =  CR, the difference between RF  and the rate paid on  overnight excess 
reserves.  (A1  ternatively, if  the System Open Market Account were directed to 
maintain a pol  icy-desired stock of reserves, CR would be determined in the 
first instance by moving up the list of feasible, but increasingly costly, 
daylight-credi  t economizing modifications in payment practices.  This bidding 
up of Roc and RF would continue unti  1  the unmet need for dayl  ight credit 
at some level of CR were equal to the supply forthcoming through the private 
daylight credit market, given the rate paid on  (and  for) overnight reserve 
balances)  . 
In the supplemental balance proposal  , any remaining need for dayl  ight 
credit would be available in unlimited supply as daylight overdrafts from the 
Federal  Reserve at the rate CR, or  from the dayl  ight credit market augmented 
by holdings of supplemental balances by banks whose short-run payments needs 
had declined after the balance calculation period.  In a long-run equilibrium, 
with unchanging payments needs at every bank, daylight overdraft exposure 
would decline for two reasons: the cost of supplemental balances would reduce 
dayl  ight overdrafts directly, and the balances would provide col  lateral to 
offset  some of  the risk exposure represented by overdrafts. 
In the pricing proposal, setting a direct charge of r  =  CR per dollar of 
dayl  ight overdraft at the Federal Reserve would call for the same payment 
practice modifications and dayl  ight-credi  t-market redi  stri  bution of required 
reserves common to the other two proposals.  Any remaining need for dayl  ight 
credit would be avai  1  able in unl  imi  ted supply as Federal  Reserve dayl  i  ght 
overdrafts. 
Standardizing the three proposals at a common marginal cost of preventing 
a net debit,  CR,  reveals their similarities and differences as strategies for 
reducing Federal Reserve daylight overdrafts and direct exposure to risk.  The three proposals would generate identical modifications in payment practices 
and in required-reserve-balance redistribution in a daylight credit market, 
with identical reductions in dayl  i  ght overdrafts.  In addition, the penal  ty 
rate proposal would el  iminate virtually 100  percent of any remaining dayl  ight 
overdrafts.  The supplemental  balance proposal would eliminate only some of 
any remaining overdrafts, but with some additional reduction in risk exposure 
from the col  lateral value of supplemental  balances.  The pricing proposal 
would not eliminate any remaining overdrafts. 
These differences in dayl  i  ght overdraft reduction in turn ref  1  ect 
differences in the volume of excess reserves associated with each proposal and 
the related potential  volume of  trading in a daylight credit market.  Because 
all excess reserves earn interest in the penalty rate case, holding excess 
reserves overnight and using them directly for payments purposes, or 
indirectly by supplying them to  a daylight credit market, allows complete 
elimination of daylight overdrafts without resorting to penalty rate borrowing 
at the discount window.  Because excess reserves do  not earn interest in the 
other two cases, and because a dayl  ight overdraft involves no penalty relative 
to  the cost of avoiding a daylight overdraft, excess reserves play no  role, 
and the volume of trading in a private daylight credit market will  be 
restricted to  redistributing required reserve balances of banks not needing 
them for  payment purposes. 
It may seem curious that excess reserves play no role in the supplemental 
balance and pricing proposals.  Why couldn't some banks hold excess reserves 
with the expectation at least of lending in both daylight and overnight funds 
markets, just as might happen in the penalty case?  The answer is that anyone 
who did this repeatedly would be a sure loser: there can be no net demand for 
pure overnight funds as long as the aggregate supply of  reserve balances is more  than  sufficient to satisfy required reserve needs,  even  though i  t 1  s 
insufficient to supply all payments  needs.  In  these  two proposals  there are 
only two funds markets:  one  for balances  that satisfy reserve requirements  and 
one  for funds  that do  not.  The  aggregate  supply of the first  kind of funds  is 
established by monetary  policy decisions  (setting "the funds rate" or the 
supply of those  reserves),  while that of the  second  is  established by payment 
system policy (setting u or n), and  there  is  no cost-effective way  to 
arbitrage between  the two kinds of  funds markets.  The  penalty rate case  is 
different  because  the earnings  rate paid on  excess  reserves  provides  an 
effective  basis for a third market,  connecting  the other two.  An  important 
implication is  that variations in  payments  needs  for balances  can  influence 
the monetary-pol i  cy-relevant funds rate in the penalty rate proposal , but not 
in the other two  cases. 
C.  Eliminating Daylight Overdraft Exposure 
So  far,  we  have  seen  that,  when  equivalently priced,  the  three proposals 
could have  markedly  different imp1  ications for Federal  Reserve  dayl  ight 
overdrafts.  Another  way  to contrast the  three proposals  is to  ask  what 
difference  in  pricing would  be  required to  achieve a common  reduction in 
Federal  Reserve  dayl  ight overdraft exposure.  Thi  s  requires examining  the 
respective prices required to reduce  dayl  ight overdraft exposure  to zero, 
because  the penalty rate proposal  is  incapable of achieving less than 
virtual  ly  complete elimination of dayl  ight overdrafts.  l4  That  is,  as  long 
as  a net debit at any  time during a day  results automatically in  a 24-hour 
discount window  loan at a rate higher  than the funds  rate,  no  bank  would 
choose  to  overdraw.  Even if  all  other adjustment mechanisms  failed  to 
materialize,  a bank  could always  borrow 24-hour  funds  to  avoid a daylight net debit,  could hold interest-earning excess  reserves,  and  would be  better off 
than  wi  th an  overdraft. 
The  supplemental  balance  approach  could achieve  the  same  result in  either 
of  two  ways.  First, if the balance ratio, r, were  set equal  to  1, 
supplemental  balances  would equal  dayl  ight overdrafts,  el  imi  nati  ng Federal 
Reserve  risk exposure  in  equilibrium with constant payments  needs  at each 
bank.  This result is independent  of the rate spread,  Et(RF -  Rs~)t+l, 
and  depends  only on  the balance  ratio, r, being equal  to  1.  Just as  in  the 
penalty rate case,  complete el  imination of Federal  Reserve  dayl  ight overdraft 
exposure  can  be  achieved at more  or less cost  to  banks,  depending on  the  size 
of  the rate spread,  (RF - RSB). 
The  second  way  to  eliminate daylight overdraft exposure  would  be  to  set a 
very high rate spread,  (RF -  RSB).  Holding  RF  at a  level  desired for 
monetary  pol  icy purposes,  and  with r  set at a positive fraction less than  1, 
the only way  to  do  this is through  the  setting of Rse,  the earnings  rate on 
supplemental  balances.  Lowering  the value of Rs8  raises the cost of 
daylight overdrafts  toward  the basic money  market  rate of interest,  RF.  AS 
the cost rises,  more  extensive and  expensive modifications in  payment 
practices become  an  economical  means  of reducing the need  for dayl  ight 
credit.  If the marginal  cost of  modifications in  payment  practices were 
reasonably elastic,  a1 1 dayl  ight credit needs  might be  eliminated at some 
positive,  albeit low,  earnings rate on  supplemental  balances.  On  the other 
hand,  if  that marginal  cost  were  quite inelastic,  the earnings  rate on 
supplemental  balances  could go  as  low as  ((r-l)/r)RF  (that  is,  a negative 
earnings  rate and  a marginal  cost of  preventing a net debit equal  to  RF) 
before a1 1 dayl  ight overdrafts were  el  imi  nated.  That  they  would be  el  imi  nated 
at this or any marginal  cost higher  than  RF is assured because  at such  a high cost, banks would find 24-hour holdings of extra non-interest-earning 
excess reserves a cheaper means of avoiding the cost of preventing a net 
debit, and monetary policy operation would supply the extra excess reserves to 
maintain a desired funds rate while satisfying the extra demand for reserves. 
The markets for required reserve balances and payments balances would become 
one. 
The pricing case is similar.  Complete elimination of  Federal Reserve 
dayl  ight overdraft exposure could be assured if  the price, n,  were less than 
RF, but high enough to elicit payment practice modifications eliminating all 
unmet needs for daylight credit.  If that did not work, then setting n  above 
RF  would, as in the supplemental balance case, merge the reserve requirement 
and payments markets for reserves, and excess reserves would become a more 
economical means of avoiding a net debit than paying the price of daylight 
overdrafts.  The result with IT  >  RF  would be much the same as an outright 
i  prohibition on dayl  ight overdrafts, sternly enforced. 
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In summary, all three of the proposals considered would reduce Federal 
1  Reserve dayl  i ght  overdraft exposure.  Moreover, a1  1  exposure could be 
/  eliminated if  the marginal cost of modifications in payments practices and 
redistribution of daylight-surplus required reserve balances were sufficiently 
elastic.  If this were not the case, then significant differences would be 
observed among the three proposals: 
-  the penalty rate regime would eliminate all remaining daylight 
overdrafts  by expanded holdings of  excess reserves and their 
redistribution in a daylight credit market; 
-  the supplemental  balance regime would eliminate some of  the remaining 
daylight overdrafts by expanded holdings of excess reserves in the 
form of supplemental balances and their redistribution in a daylight 
credit market; -  the pricing regime would eliminate none of the remaining daylight 
overdrafts. 
0.  Reducing the Cost of Payment System Risk 
Implementing one or another of the day1  ight-overdraft-reduci  ng proposal  s 
has been shown to trigger a variety of adjustment mechanisms.  If a proposal 
will  reduce what we have called the costs of PSR, it must be because those 
adjustment mechani  sms wi 11 reduce moral hazard, systemic risk, or competitive 
inequality.  Of course, none of the three proposals deals with private net 
settlement networks like CHIPS, or with overdrafts arising from payments for 
book-entry government securities.  Therefore, no matter how effective a 
proposal might be in reducing PSR costs, it would not represent complete PSR 
reform. 
Two conclusions emerge from tracing the effects of  adjustment mechanisms 
on PSR costs.  One is simply that the three proposals could differ 
substantially in their effectiveness in ameliorating the costs of PSR.  The 
other is that no  firm conclusions are likely to be drawn about these three  (or 
any other) reform proposals unti  1  the Federal Reserve makes 1  asti  ng deci  sions 
about some institutional details of its own operating and regulatory structure. 
1.  Moral Hazard.  Moral hazard arises from an informational asymmetry that 
prevents those at risk from controlling their exposure effectively.  The 
exi  sting PSR program, whi  le setting  1  imi  ts on permi  ssi  ble overdrafts based on 
each bank's assessment of its own credit quality, is thought to be ineffective 
because the limits are, in many cases, not binding, and in any event not 
strictly enforceable.  (Reckless  driving is discovered only after the 
accident.)  The three proposals would either replace or supplement existing 1  imi  ts by making dayl  ight overdrafts costly. 
Modified payment practices could reduce moral hazard.  It is true that 
such devices as long-maturi  ty bank 1  iabi  1 i  ti  es, customer netting of 
obl  igations, and new private payment networks wi 11 transfer exposure to 
private market participants.  However, even if  these adjustments were merely 
part of a zero-sum risk game, moral hazard could decl  ine.  Whereas payee banks 
now have no reason, and existing Federal  Reserve limits are not adequate, to 
enforce credit qua1  i  ty standards on users of dayl  ight credit on Fedwire, 
rep1  acement creditors introduced by modified payment practices might have a 
direct incentive to base credit extensions on credit judgments about payor 
banks.  A  similar conclusion would hold to the extent that payor banks would 
need market financing of  excess reserve or supplemental balances.  Market 
financing  would require passing a market test of the kind that is lacking in 
today's dayl  ight overdrafts. 
The same argument has been made about a private daylight credit market: 
payor banks borrowing dayl  ight funds to avoid dayl  ight overdrafts wi 11 not 
escape careful credit judgments of lenders.  Unfortunately, Dr. Seuss' "If 
such a thing could be, it certainly would be" is not necessarily true. 
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Replacing dayl  ight overdrafts with some of these a1  ternatives could, but need 
not, reduce moral hazard.  The matter is in doubt because the outcome depends 
on some unspecified institutional details of  daylight credit,  of private net 
settlement systems, and of the reformed daylight overdraft facilities 
introduced by the proposals. 
A  private interbank daylight credit market would reduce moral hazard only 
if  daylight lenders knew themselves to be at risk and had information 
necessary to  control their exposure.  Both conditions are questionahle. 
Would lenders in a private dayl  ight credit market face a risk of nonpayment?  The  problem  is  that,  whi le any  of the proposals  might  lead banks 
to  borrow daylight credit in  the private market  under  normal  circumstances, 
none  of the proposals  would prevent a bank  from overdrawing  during the day  and 
overnight under  abnormal  circumstances,  which  is  what  risk is  about.  Would  a 
debtor  bank,  unexpectedly  in  trouble,  suspend  payments  by  defaulting on  a 
daylight loan rather than overdraw  its  deposit account at a Federal  Reserve 
Bank?  A  bank  unexpectedly  in  extremis  should have  no  difficulty in  repaying 
its dayl  ight creditors on  Fedwire even if it  had  insufficient funds  because 
overdraft monitoring at Federal  Reserve Banks  is  only ex  post.  None  of  the 
current proposals  suggests  moving  to  real-time balance monitoring.  Such 
payments  carry receiver finality,  and  none  of the current proposals  has  so 
much  as  hinted at altering the irrevocable nature of Fedwire payments. 
The  only banks  subject  to  real-time monitoring are those  the authorities 
already know  to be  in trouble.  Would  the authorities allow banks  under  their 
continuous  scrutiny to  become  further  overextended  through dayl i  ght borrowing 
and  then prevent the troubled banks  from repaying? 
Answers  to these  two questions can  be  only conjecture,  but there seems  to 
be  a fair chance  that daylight loans  would be  considered  riskless by daylight 
lenders,  and  in  fact would  be  riskless to them  because  the exposure  would 
remain  with the Federal  Reserve,  either as  operator of Fedwire or as 
supervisor of troubled banks.  Moral  hazard would remain  intact even  to  the 
extent that Federal  Reserve  dayl  ight overdrafts were  replaced by dayl  ight 
loans  in  a private interbank market. 
A  similar argument  applies if the proposals  result in the development of 
private payment  network's  in  competition with Fedwire,  comparable  to  CHIPS.  As 
long as  there  is no coherent  framework of payments  finality on  such  systems, 
banks  extending daylight credit may  not perceive the extent of the credit risk they assume,  and  therefore may  fail fully to  manage  risk.  Unlike 
the dayl  ight credit market  case,  however,  risk exposure  would not remain  with 
the Federal  Reserve. 
Informational  deficiencies arising from external i  ties in  private dayl  ight 
credit arrangements  might diminish the reduction in  moral  hazard  even if 
private lenders were  (and  knew  they were)  exposed  to credit risk.  How  could 
dayl  ight lenders  judge  credit qua1 i  ty  of banks  who  could borrow additional 
amounts  from other  lenders  in  the daylight credit market,  or how  could a 
creditor in  a private payment  network set an  appropriate bilateral net credit 
1  imit  for  a payor  bank  in  ignorance  of  bilateral credits provided to  the  same 
payor  bank  by other network participants? 
This  is  not a problem unique  to  daylight credit:  recent leveraged buyouts 
of  industrial firms have  highlighted this "event risk"  problem  in  corporate 
bond  markets,  but in  that case  new  issues have  begun  to  include bond  covenants 
protecting the lender  from takeover-re1  ated increases  in  debt-equi ty 
ratios. ''  Day1  ight credit arrangements may  not be  amenable  to comparable 
covenants,  but protections might  still be  possible in standard  legal 
agreements  underlying daylight loans,  or by making  the rate paid depend on 
total daylight borrowing  which  itself became  a matter of public record via 
brokers'  screens.  Similarly,  on  private payment  networks,  bilateral limits 
and  amounts  drawn,  and  network  debit caps  and  amounts  drawn,  a1 1 might become 
information  provided on a continuously updated  basis  throughout  the dayl  ight 
hours  for  the use  of potential daylight lenders. 
Clearly,  the  three reform proposals  would  have  identical, if  quite 
uncertain,  imp1 i  cations for reducing moral  hazard  in  that,  equivalently 
priced,  they would  induce  identical modifications in  payment  practices and 
redistribution of  daylight-surplus required reserves.  Beyond  that,  however, their implications differ.  The penalty rate proposal relies heavily on excess 
reserves, and therefore on market scrutiny of a bank's creditworthiness in 
traditional markets for bank liabilities, both insured and uninsured.  Thus, a 
moral hazard problem of Federal Reserve daylight overdrafts is transformed 
into a moral  hazard problem of deposit insurance.  In part, the same is true 
of  the supplemental balance proposal, but is not true at all of the pricing 
proposal.  By the same token, the pricing proposal would simply retain the 
existing daylight overdraft facility and, with a flat-rate price unrelated to 
risk, retain moral hazard.  The supplemental balance proposal does the same, 
although on a smaller scale. 
At  a more basic level, all  three proposals might retain a substantial 
moral hazard.  None of the proposals envisions pricing based on the actuarial 
or judgmental probability of a bank's inability to repay daylight credit, and 
none removes the simple mechanism by which the Federal Reserve now insures all 
but problem banks against a shortage of daylight credit.  Pricing still 
assures any bank that is unexpectedly in extremis of unlimited daylight 
credit  ; the supplemental balance proposal retains the same assurance; even the 
penalty rate proposal , whi  le requiring col  1  ateral for discount window loans to 
cover dayl  ight overdrafts, nonetheless has no means of  preventing overdrafts 
in excess of collateral.  Only a real-time balance monitor, with the 
capability of rejecting or at least pending-for-approval at risk-based limits, 
could remove this ultimate moral  hazard: that the existence of an assured 
source of  dayl  ight credit wi 11 invite practices that increase the probabi  1  i ty 
of its use. 
2.  Systemic Risk.  Issues of  systemic risk are not addressed directly by any 
of the three proposals; none is specifically directed at the CHIPS network, or at similar networks  that might develop  in  competition with Fedwire when 
Federal  Reserve  daylight credit becomes  more  expensive.  To  the extent that 
private networks provide a substitute for Federal  Reserve  day1 ight credit, 
systemic  risk  might become  a  more  costly problem,  offsetting gains from 
reduced moral  hazard.  For  thi  s reason,  the proposal s cannot  be  considered  in 
isolation,  but must  be  incorporated  into an  integrated view of Federal  Reserve 
PSR  policy,  whether  that policy be  implicit or explicit. 
The  cost of systemic  risk is the possibility of a chain of liquidity 
insolvencies  for  banks  left  empty-handed  at the end  of a day  because  other 
banks  are unable  to  make  settlement,  and  the market  disruptions brought on  by 
uncertainty about  who  paid whom  on  that day  and  about  opening balances  on 
succeeding days.  If private networks  are  to carry a larger share  of 
large-do1  lar payments,  then there  is  a need  to  assure a coherent  framework  in 
law,  regulation,  or network rules that either removes  serious  threat of 
systemic  risk, or makes  that risk manageable  by  network participants. 
Otherwise,  the  lender of last resort and  other banking authorities face a 
moral  hazard--that  the existence of a safety net invites disregard of  systemic 
risk by  banks. 
Controlling systemic  risk is not a settled matter.  One  issue  is whether 
the framework  for private network  settlement  requires attention to  both 
finality and  settlement,  or simply  to settlement.  That  is, can  systemic  risk 
be  control  led only by  a credible guarantee of  final i  ty,  so  that a1 1  payments 
made  by  the offending bank  are final despite its inabi  1 i  ty to settle, or is a 
credible guarantee  of settlement  sufficient,  with finality only provisional  so 
that payments  can  be  reversed later, if necessary?  The  distinction could be 
important.  A  guarantor of finality  might have  recourse for repayment  only to 
the (presumably)  failed bank.  A  guarantor of settlement only,  however,  might have  recourse to  unfai  led parties whose  payments  were  not final,  leaving a1 1 
parties with a heal  thy concern for credit risk in  making payments.  A 
settlement guarantee  would  seem  sufficient to  preclude  systemic risk  of 
liquidity insolvencies in  a private network,  but whether  a network without a 
finality guarantee  could be  competitive with Fedwire is  not clear. 
A  second  issue is the appropriate role of the Federal  Reserve  in 
control  1 i  ng  systemic  risk on private networks,  other than a concern  that there 
be  a coherent framework  for finality and  settlement.  The  System might have 
difficulty  guaranteeing finality because it  would  seem  to  imply guaranteed 
access  to  the discount window  for insolvent banks.  Less  troublesome might be 
a settlement  guarantee implemented,  for example,  by assuring access  to the 
discount window  for otherwise  solvent banks  caught  short of good  funds  by 
failure of  one  or a series of  other network members  to  make  end-of-day 
settlement payments. 
The  point is simply that adopting PSR  pol  icy proposals to  reduce  day1  ight 
overdrafts that induce banks  to  develop private payment  networks may  be 
premature unti  1 a coherent framework  for control  1  i  ng  systemic  risk can  be 
developed. 
3.  Competitive Inequality.  Making daylight credit more  expensive  when  using 
Fedwi  re for payments  reduces  the apparent  competi ti  ve  advantage of  Fedwi re in 
the payment  system.  The  extent of  this reduction would  depend  on both the 
level of the "price" set under  any one  of the  three proposal  s and  the nature 
of  the framework  for finality and  settlement on private payment  networks. 
It is  one  thing to  observe  that offering receiver finality and  immediate 
settlement at no charge on  Fedwire precludes  significant private competition 
with Fedwire.  It is  quite another  thing to  define the price for daylight credit,  or private network rules for finality and  settlement,  that would 
define  competi tive equal i  ty  between  Federal Reserve payment  servi  ces  and 
private networks.  The  Federal  Reserve must  always  have  a competitive edge  in 
ensuring access  to  credit because it  alone can manufacture unlimited credit, 
and  there is  no sound  basis for incorporating that advantage  in  pricing. 
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Product  differentiation must  be  the basi  s for competition between  the Federal 
Reserve  and private payment  networks.  Regulatory oversight may  call for 
internal network rules about setting and monitoring participant risk,  to 
assure  that moral  hazard is  minimized.  Some  form of  settlement guarantee may 
be  required to  minimize  systemi  c ri  sk.  In  combination,  these  requirements 
mean  that Fedwire would  be  differentiated from private networks  on  the basis 
of  the risk  exposure  of  payees  who  become  net creditors on a private network. 
Imposing a price for Federal  Reserve  day1  ight credit introduces a problem 
of  adverse  selection:  the higher the Federal  Reserve  price,  the lower  the 
1  ikely qua1 i  ty  of the average  bank  remaining on  Fedwire,  and  the riskier the 
pool  of  credit extended by  the Federal  Reserve  in  making  payments.  Even  with 
the penalty rate proposal,  there may  be  banks  who  find the administered 
penalty rate on overdrafts more  attractive than  the risk-augmented market 
terms  they might face  to  meet  credit requirements on a competing private 
network.  Ultimately, if  policy intent were  to  allow competition without 
a1  lowing adverse  selection,  an  outright prohibition of  Federal  Reserve 
daylight credit,  enforced with a real-time monitor,  might be  the only 
effective  solution. 
IV.  Conclusion 
The  fundamental  concern--that uncol 1  ateral i  zed  Federal  Reserve  credi t, 
even  though  limited to  daylight maturities,  may  be  inconsistent with the Federal Reserve Act--would provide the clearest direction for PSR pol  icy. 
Alternatively, any of  the three proposals examined here could be employed to 
el iminate dayl  ight overdrafts.  But the world has changed since Fedwi  re 
payments involved no daylight credit.  Returning to that cash-in-advance 
system in a world of telecommunications and tri  11  ion-do1  1  ar transaction days 
would require integrating the chosen proposal  into a broader pol  icy reform 
focused on moral  hazard, systemic risk, and terms on which private payment 
networks would operate.  This surely would require a real-time monitor to 
enforce. 
The more pragmatic concern about Federal Reserve risk exposure from 
daylight overdrafts could be addressed by the three proposals in slightly 
different ways.  The pricing proposal to set a fee per dollar of daylight 
overdraft is simple and direct.  Setting the price "low" initially and raising 
the price periodically thereafter has the advantage of testing a frequently 
voiced judgment that most dayl  ight overdrafts could be el  iminated cheaply by 
simple changes in payments practices.  If that did not turn out to be the 
case, then the supplemental balance proposal could achieve a 1  arger reduction 
in overdrafts simply by the larger balances from which transactions are made. 
The penalty rate proposal would go  further, assuring virtually complete 
elimination of daylight overdrafts. 
Imp1  ementi  ng any of  these proposal  s, however, does not deal effectively 
with the underlying costs of moral hazard, systemic risk, and competitive 
inequality that characterize the payment system risk problem.  Indiscriminate 
provision of daylight credit, even at a positive price, retains moral hazard. 
Inducing the development of a private daylight credit market need not reduce 
moral hazard either, if  no real-time monitor is in place to  enforce assignment 
of credit risk to private lenders.  Inducing the development of  private payment  networks  leaves  risk assignment  muddy  if  finality and  settlement  rules 
are inexact,  and  increases  the presumption of  rescue by  the federal safety  net 
if systemic  risk is  not managed.  Nor  could private networks  be  relied upon 
without assuring terms on  which  they might compete  successful  ly  with Fedwire 
without creating an  adverse selection problem. 
In  short,  none  of the three proposals brings a satisfactory resolution to 
the payment  system risk problem.  Resolution requires their integration into a 
more  encompassing  policy reform. Footnotes 
CHIPS  is  a private interbank  telecommunication payment  network operated 
by  the New  York Clearing House.  This paper  deals only with CHIPS  and 
with Fedwire,  the Federal  Reserve's  electronic funds  transfer system.  A 
third system,  for transfers of  book-entry Treasury  securities against 
reserve deposit balances,  contributes $60 bi  11  ion of the $1  15  bi  11  ion 
average  sum  of the maximum  daily daylight credit on  Fedwire.  This system 
is not considered  here because  of its specialized business  and  because 
its relevance  is concentrated at only a handful  of  banks. 
Two  forces are now  at work  to limit supply.  Members  of CHIPS  can  and  do 
set dollar limits on  their net credit positions with respect  to  other 
members  during a day  in  real time.  Federal  Reserve  rules since 1986  have 
set an  upper  limit  on any  bank's  cross  system net debit,  although the 
limits do not appear  to  have  been  a constraint on most  banks  and  are not 
administered  in  real time. 
These  proposals  are described in  Van  Hoose  (19881,  the Angel1  proposal  of 
a penalty rate;  Hamdani  and  Wenni nger  (1  988>,  suppl  emental  balances ; and 
Large-Dollar Payments  System  Advisory Group  (19881,  pricing. 
The  phrase  is from Mengle  (1988),  who  provides  a useful discussion of 
finality issues. 
Humphrey  (1986)  provides  simulations of such  chain reactions. 
See  Mi  1  ano  (  1988). 
Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Cleveland,  Operating Letter #9,  August  1,  1939. 
Annual  Report,  Board of  Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  System,  1947; 
1  983. 
This  argument  is  different from that in  Van  Hoose  (19881,  where  neither a 
bank  nor  its  Federal  Reserve  Bank  knows  about  a day1  ight overdraft  unti  1 
after the fact.  While  the Federal  Reserve  has  no immediate  program  to 
integrate real-time monitoring into Fedwire operations,  banks  should be 
able to monitor  their positions in  real time both from their own 
information and  by  using the Federal  Reserve  real-time Automated  Balance 
Monitoring System. 
Simmons  (1987)  contains an  extensive discussion of daylight funds market 
possi  bi  1  i  ties. 
Humphrey  (1  987)  and  Large-Do1  lar Payments  System Advi sory Group  (1  988) 
contain detai  led explanations of a number  of such  potential modifications. 
12.  The  arbitraged relationship is explained  in  Van  Hoose  (1988). 13.  David Humphrey  has  pointed out that,  at this common  rate,  the  stated 
price for a dayl  ight overdraft in  the pricing proposal  would  have  to  be 
about  40  percent higher  than a and  (RF-RON)  if  IT  is  to  equal  CR. 
The  reason  is that interest rates apply to  a 365-day  year,  but the price 
charged  for a daylight overdraft applies only to  about  255  business  days. 
14.  Two  situations might give rise to  overdrafts.  One  is closed markets, 
mentioned previously.  The  other would arise if variations in the funds 
rate brought it  up  to the level of the discount rate,  removing  its 
penalty feature.  Wi  th the penal ty  removed,  banks  would be  indifferent 
between  dayl  ight overdraft loans  and  purchases  of 24-hour  funds.  Either 
would  fund a potential net debit and  earn  interest at the overnight rate. 
15.  The  aphorism  is  from McElligotls Pool,  in which  a boy  fishes in a mud 
puddle,  fantasizing that it  has  a  hidden connection  to the seven  seas. 
16.  International  Financing Review,  Issue 751,  November  19,  1988,  p.  3774. 
Neither  is it  possible to  use  a pure private market  solution as  a 
paradigm  for public provision,  as  some  have  tried to  do  (Van  Hoose 
C19881;  Task  Force  on Control  1 ing Payments  System Risk  C19881).  The  fact 
is that the U.S.  payment  system  is  based  on  fiat  money  produced'by  the 
Federal  Reserve.  One  question  is  of the terms  (the Federal  Reserve  price 
for  daylight credit) on  which  that fiat  money  should be  supplied through 
Federal  Reserve  credit during a day,  in  addition to the monetary  pol  icy 
specification of the terms on  which it  should be  supplied from day  to 
day.  The  other question  is  of the  terms  on  which private institutions 
should be  allowed  to  provide competing  private credit during the day. 
The  two questions  are obviously related,  and  their answers  will determine 
the mix of pub1  ic and  private credit used  to  faci  1  i  tate payments.  The 
appropriate mix cannot  be  determined  by  reference  to the terms  on  which  a 
single element  of the mix would  be  provided in  a world without  the other. - 43 - 
Appendi x 
Confronting the payment  system risk problem of day1 i  ght credit became 
unavoidable  in the late 1970s  under  the pressures  of technological change  and 
of  the demand  for same-day  net settlement  service for private large-value 
payment  networks.  Originally,  starting in  1918,  telegraph,  telephone,  or mai 1 
messages  to the Federal  Reserve  were  the only mechanisms  for transferring 
ownership of reserve deposit  balances  between  banks  wi  th same-day  final i  ty. 
Other  devices were  official checks  and  an  early version of  CHIPS,  requiring at 
least a one-day  period for clearing and  finality, or interbank messages  that 
simply instructed a bank  to  use  Fedwire to transfer funds. 
Development  of new  computer-to-computer  telecommunications  technology  for 
Fedwire and  CHIPS  payments,  and  for interbank message  systems,  suggested  a new 
possibility.  Private net settlement  systems  like CHIPS  and  Bankwire's 
then-proposed  Cashwire might clear payment  messages  among  a  set of 
participants during the day  and  present a balanced  set of net debit and  credit 
positions to the Fed  for settlement at the end of the  same  day,  achieving 
same-day  settlement finality.  This offered the dual  advantages  of reducing 
the costly overnight float financing of banks  in  net debit position by  those 
in  net credit position,  and  of shortening the length of time during which 
bilateral credit positions exposed  banks  to credit risk.  (The  Canadian 
banking  system went  a different route,  continuing to  use  paper  checks  even  for 
securities market  transactions,  but eliminating overnight float by  making  ex 
post adjustments  of prior-day balances  at the Bank  of Canada  for settlement; 
duration of  risk exposure  in  clock time was  not reduced,  however.) Operating detai  1  s of telecommunication devices,  accounting system 
modifications,  backup  facilities,  and  daily time  schedules  were  laid out 
quickly,  but the enterpri  se  foundered on  the "unpostable debi t"--that  i  s,  what 
to  do if one  of the participants did not have  sufficient funds  in  its  reserve 
account  to  cover  its  net debit on  a private network  at settlement hour.  Some 
found  this an  operational  inconvenience  that should be  ignored:  from  an 
operations perspective, it  was  no  problem as  long as  the accounting system was 
designed to  accept  negative numbers.  After a1 1,  Fedwire did not check  to see 
whether  a bank  had  sufficient funds  to  cover  a wire transfer request,  so  why 
should a net settlement message  be  treated any  differently?  Others  found  it 
scandalous,  or at least troubling,  to  design a system in  which  the central 
bank  automatical  ly  would  guarantee a private settlement by  accepting an 
unpostable  debit as  an  offset to  irrevocable credits.  The  issue remained 
unresolved  for several  years,  but two developments  forced  some  action. 
One  of  these  developments  was  the increased  incidence of overnight 
overdrafts of reserve accounts  and  adoption of the current Federal  Reserve 
overnight overdraft policy.  High  interest rates,  mushrooming  wire transfer 
traffic,  and  decl  ining reserve requirements  were  making reserve  deposit 
accounts  a less and  less effective buffer stock  in  banks
1  daily reserve 
management.  With no overnight overdraft pol  icy other  than Regulation D (that 
banks  mai ntai  n an  average  requi  red balance over  a reserve maintenance  period), 
concern  was  mounting  that banks  might abuse  the Federal  Reserve  by running 
overnight overdrafts when  especially profitable opportunities arose.  (An 
egregious  example  was  an  occasion on  which  the Open  Market  Desk  did a large 
late-i  n-the-day matched  salelpurchase  transaction to  drain reserves only to 
find  that the counterparty bank  "happened"  to  run an  equivalent overnight 
overdraft.) The second development was a carefully constructed survey that revealed 
the extent of dayl  ight overdrafts.  Developing an overnight overdraft pol  icy 
led  to more widespread realization within the Federal  Reserve that dayl  ight 
overdrafts were a fact of 1  ife.  There was no way to prevent dayl  ight 
overdrafts, but neither was there a way to  know how widespread the practice 
was.  The survey served as a factual foundation for debating and developing 
the current PSR pol  icy: self-set 1  imi  ts on cross system net debit positions, 
bi lateral credit 1  imi  ts and mu1  ti lateral debit 1  imi  ts on private systems, wi th 
a stated Federal Reserve intention to ratchet-down the debit limits over time. References 
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